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Exchange Rate Regime and Wage Determination 





After the eastern enlargement of the European Union due to increasing labor market 
integration, wage determination and monetary integration in Central and Eastern Europe have 
become key issues in European economic policy making. Based on the Scandinavian model 
of wage adjustment by Lindbeck (1979), we intend to analyze the role of exchange rates in 
the wage determination process of the Central and Eastern European countries to identify 
which exchange rate strategy contributes to faster wage convergence in Europe. Panel 
estimations reveal a robust negative relationship between exchange rates and wage growth. 
This suggests that workers in countries with fixed exchange rates are likely to benefit from 
higher wage increases. 
JEL Code: C23, J30, F31, O52. 
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1.  Introduction  
Choosing the appropriate exchange rate regime remains an important and controversial economic 
policy issue for the Central and Eastern European countries (Belke and Kaas 2004, von Hagen 
and Zhou 2005, Fidrmuc and Korhonen 2006, Schnabl 2008). Although exchange rate stability in 
CEE has grown since the introduction of the euro different exchange rate strategies persist. While 
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic are pegging their 
currencies tightly to the euro or have chosen to join the euro area, the Czech Republic, Poland 
and most recently Hungary allow their exchange rates to be widely determined by market forces. 
The central bank of Romania manages the exchange rate discretionarily.  
 
At the same time wage determination in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has become a key 
issue in European economic policy making, as large differences in wage levels persist (ECOFIN 
2005, European Commission 2007). For instance, labor unions in CEE have tended to claim 
substantial wage increases to achieve a faster wage convergence to the EU15 (see for instance the 
Skoda wage bargaining process in the Czech Republic 2007). These claims have been 
accentuated by the fact that rising production, increasing productivity and labor migration to 
Western Europe have led to a shortage of (highly-qualified) workers (Goretti 2008). Nonetheless, 
institutional factors such as the different tax systems, wage rigidities, a low degree of both 
unionization and collective bargaining have contributed to the persistence of wage gaps (EIRO 
2008). 
 
Although both, the choice of exchange rate regime and the wage determination process in Central 
and Eastern Europe have been subject to extensive academic discussions, until now 
comparatively few papers have scrutinized the interaction of both, i.e. the role of exchange rates 
for wage setting in Central and Eastern Europe. According to Mundell's (1961) seminal theory of 
optimum currency areas, a high degree of wage flexibility is required if exchange rates are 
irrevocably fixed and heterogeneity within the monetary union remains high. Based on this 
criterion, Paas et al. (2002), Belke and Kaas (2004), Gruber (2004), Iara and Traistaru (2004) and 
Babestskii (2007) among others, have analyzed the degree of wage flexibility in CEE. 
 
  1Belke and Setzer (2003) and Belke et al. (2004) are considering the impact of exchange rate 
volatility on labor markets in CEE. They argue that exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis the euro 
significantly contributes to higher unemployment. Schnabl (2008) studies the effect of exchange 
rate volatility on economic growth in the EMU periphery. He argues that exchange rate stability 
provides more certainty for the wage bargaining process in small open economies and thereby 
leads to higher growth and wages. 
 
We will build upon this discussion by examining which exchange rate strategy provides a more 
favorable framework for the wage setting process in emerging markets leading to faster wage 
growth in CEE. The investigation will be based on the seminal Lindbeck model of wage 
convergence during the economic catch-up which will be tested empirically. 
  
2. Theoretical Framework of Exchange Rate Regimes and Wage Determination 
The literature dealing with wage determination and exchange rates goes back to the Bretton 
Woods era. Friedman (1953), Meade (1951) and Mundell (1961) saw exchange rate flexibility as 
a substitute for wage rigidity in the face of asymmetric shocks.  Given flexible exchange rates 
and rigid wages in small open economies (as they prevail in CEE), a negative (positive) 
productivity shock is offset by currency depreciation (appreciation). Monetary expansion and 
depreciation are seen as Keynesian tools to address deflationary shocks and sustain growth and 
welfare.  
 
In contrast, in the Scandinavian model of wage adjustment (Lindbeck 1979) fixed exchange rates 
provide a more stable and growth enhancing framework for wage determination in small open 
economies during the economic catch-up process. In this dynamic extension of the Balassa-
Samuelson model (Balassa 1964, Samuelson 1964), fixed exchange rates lead to more certainty 
in the wage bargaining process as enterprises and trade unions can rely on a more stable 
macroeconomic environment for the wage bargaining process. The outcome is higher wages than 
under flexible exchange rate regimes. 
 
In this paper we apply Lindbeck´s (1979) approach to CEE.  The  Scandinavian  model             
which goes back to a group of Norwegian (see Aukrust, Holte and Stoltz 1967) and Swedish 
  2economists (Edgren, Gösta, Faxén and Odhner 1970) and was summarized by Lindbeck (1979)
1 
was designed to explain the wage adjustment of the Scandinavian countries in the economic 
catch-up versus the US. Under the Bretton Woods System of fixed dollar parities, during the 
1950s and 60s, Sweden along with Norway and Denmark were among Western Europe’s fastest 
growing economies. In contrast to the CEE countries today, where different exchange rate 
strategies coexist, all Scandinavian countries fixed their currencies to the dollar. The 
Scandinavian model of wage adjustment had the basic idea that nominal wage growth is driven 
by productivity increases and inflation. Domestic inflation was expressed in terms of world 
inflation and exchange rate developments. 
 
One basic assumption of the Lindbeck model is that purchasing power parity holds: Given perfect 
arbitrage, domestic price inflation in the tradable good sector   is assumed to be equal to 
inflation on world traded good markets (measured in terms of the dominant international money) 




T p Δ e Δ . Formally,  
 




T Δ + Δ = Δ
 
While Lindbeck assumed the dollar to be the dominant international money, we assume that the 
euro is the dominant reference currency for CEE as most international goods and financial flows 
in CEE are denominated in euros (ECB 2008). The Scandinavian authors in the 1960s did not 
consider exchange rates to be important policy variables since the Scandinavian exchange rates 
were tightly fixed to the dollar and exchange rate changes were (close to) zero. They assumed 
that arbitrage in international traded goods markets ensured that inflation in the domestic traded 
goods sector converged to inflation in the dollar denominated world traded goods markets as in 
equation (1).  
 
Lindbeck (1979) further assumed that the wage bargaining process was initiated in the 
(industrial) tradable goods sector, where labor productivity tends to grow faster than in the non-
tradable (service) sector.
2 As workers are aware of increasing productivity, they bargain fiercely 
                                                 
1     For an empirical analysis of  the Lindbeck model for the  Scandinavian countries see  Forslund et al. (2006). 
2   In contrast, Goretti (2008) argues that the wage bargaining process may start in the (non-traded goods) public 
sector and is transmitted to the other sectors of the economy. 
  3for respective wage increases. Let   be the productivity growth in the tradable sector, 
reflecting increasing stocks of human and physical capital. The trade unions in the ''unsheltered'' 
tradable sector are assumed to orient their wage bargaining on productivity gains plus eventual 
price increases of tradable goods world market prices . Therefore, the average rate of the 
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According to Lindbeck in small open economies (such as in CEE) the wage bargaining process 
can be regarded as being constrained by fixed exchange rates. If trade unions bargain for nominal 
wage increases beyond equation (2), manufacturing goods become uncompetitive in world 
markets with a fall in employment.
 3 While wage increases beyond equation (2) may be possible 
in the short-run, in the long-run trade unions would return to equation (2) to avoid  rising 
structural unemployment. Thus, equation (2) defines the natural (long-run) rate of nominal wage 
increases in a small open economy. As long as inflation in world prices   remains low and 
fairly predictable, workers are content to bargain for the concurrent trends in domestic 




As in the Balassa-Samuelson framework, Lindbeck (1979) assumed that labor ''solidarity'' and 
labor mobility between the manufacturing sector and the non-tradable sectors transmit the 








T w w w Δ = Δ = Δ
 
where   denotes the wage growth in the whole economy. As the non-tradable sectors were 
widely shielded from world markets, prices in these sectors were assumed not to be driven by 
international competition but would be based on domestic labor costs. Thus, the price increases in 
d w Δ
                                                 
3    It is argued for instance, that recently the real wage increases in the Baltics and Hungary have gone beyond 
productivity increases. 
  4the non-tradable sector  are a function of wage increases  subtracting the productivity 
gains in the non-traded goods sector , where productivity increases in the non-tradable 
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The equations (1), (2), (3) and (4) yield equation (5) which shows the impact of world market 
prices, exchange rate changes and relative sectoral productivity gains on prices of non-traded 
goods: 
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In the Scandinavian model, the wage bargaining and price adjustment processes in the traded and 
non-traded goods sectors affect general inflation  , which is defined as a composite of traded 
goods inflation and non-traded goods inflation given the respective weights 
d p Δ
α and ( α − 1 ) in the 
consumer basket: 
 





d p p p Δ − + Δ = Δ α α
 
Inserting equations (1), (5) and (6) yield equation (7) which can be interpreted as an overall 
measure for supply-driven inflation in a small open economy in the economic catch-up process: 
 







d q q e p p Δ − Δ − + Δ + Δ = Δ α
 
In equation (7) the term   is equivalent to imported inflation. If world market prices in 
the traded goods sector rise (fall) and/or if the exchange rate depreciates (appreciates), this would 
fuel domestic inflation (deflation). The term  captures the structural 
component of inflation, which is in line with the Balassa-Samuelson effect of supply driven 
) ( e p
W
T Δ + Δ




T q q Δ − Δ −α
  5inflation (Balassa 1964 and Samuelson 1964).
4 Relative productivity gains in the tradable goods 
sector   are translated via the wage bargaining process into higher inflation. The 
greater the weight of the non-tradable goods sector in the economy





) 1 ( α − , or the larger the 
difference between productivity growth of the tradable and the non-tradable goods sector, the 
larger the impact on domestic inflation. 
 
3. Wage Adjustment in Labor Markets under Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes 
Whereas the Lindbeck model was originally constructed for the Scandinavian countries which 
pegged their currencies to the dollar, today the CEE countries can choose their exchange rate 
strategies (see Table 1): The Baltics have chosen a hard peg to the euro within the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism 2 and aim to adopt the euro as a legal tender as soon as possible. In contrast, the 
monetary authorities of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have implemented an inflation 
targeting frameworks and let their exchange rates float (more or less) freely. They have continued 
to postpone the euro adoption targets. 
 
Figure 1 shows the de facto quarterly exchange rate changes of the CEE countries currencies 
against the euro (before 1999 the DM). There are two clusters. The first group of countries, 
namely Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland allowed their exchange rate to 
float to a high degree, while the second group, the Baltic countries and Slovenia, exhibit low 
exchange rate volatility against the euro. The Estonian currency board is pegging the kroon 
tightly to the euro (or DM) in the whole observation period.  Lithuania and Latvia pegged their 
currencies to the dollar and a currency basket before pegging them to the euro. With the 
introduction of the euro in January 2009, Slovakia will shift from widely flexibly to a “tightly 
fixed” exchange rate. Choosing alternative exchange rate strategies will have different 
implications for the wage setting process in the economic catch-up. Following De Grauwe and 
Schnabl (2005), we show that the industrial catch-up of emerging markets under alternative 
exchange rate strategies leads to two alternative outcomes depending on the monetary 
framework: First, if exchange rates are pegged, the relative productivity gains drive up prices as 
in the seminal Balassa-Samuelson model.  
                                                 
4     Schnabl (2008) discusses the possible shortcomings of the Balassa-Samuelson approach. 
  6Table 1: Exchange rate strategies in CEE in 2008 
Country  Current exchange rate system  Euro adoption 
CZ  Free floating with inflation target since 
1997, from 1995 till 1997 managed 
float 
The preliminary target date (1 January 2010) 
was withdrawn by the government on 25 
October 2006. No new date has been officially 
set for the time being. 
EE  Currency board with a hard peg to the 
euro within the ERM II (since June 
2004) 
EE targets euro area membership as soon as 
possible (2011 being the earliest possible 
envisaged date according to current inflation 
forecasts). 
HU  Free floating since March 2008, before 
managed floats, with inflation target 
since 2002 
The Convergence Programme of 1 December 
2006 aims at meeting the Maastricht criteria in 
2009. A new target date for the adoption of the 
euro has not been specified. 
LT  Currency board with a hard peg to the 
euro within the ERM II (since June 
2004), before hard dollar peg 
The specific target date has not been set. 
According to the government, LT will aim to 
join the euro area as soon as possible and the 
more favourable period to join starts from 2010. 
LV  Currency board with a hard peg to the 
euro within the ERM II (since May 
2005), before currency basket 
The specific target date has not been set. 
PL  Free floating with inflation target since 
2000, from 1995 till 2000 managed 
float 
The specific target date has not been set. 
SK  ERM II membership (exchange rate 
with 15 percent fluctuation band) since 
November 2005, before managed floats 
January 2009 
SI  EMU membership since January 2007, 
before ERM II membership (exchange 
rate with 15 percent 
fluctuation band) since June 2004 
January 2007 
Source: ECB (2008) and European Commission (2007). 
 
 
  7Figure 1: Exchange rate changes, quarter-over-quarter 
 
 




Second, if exchange rates are freely floating and the central banks follow an inflation target, 
relative productivity gains are accompanied by nominal appreciation. Even if both monetary 
frameworks can be seen as equal policy choices to engineer the real appreciation which is the 
natural outcome of industrial catch-up, exchange rate volatility and sustained nominal 
appreciation may increase uncertainty in labor markets. 
 
  8Based on the Scandinavian model we derive the implication for the wage determination process 
in emerging markets under alternative exchange rate regimes. From equation (2), (3) and (4) we 
define the overall wage growth as the sum of overall productivity growth and inflation: 
 
  ,                            (8) 
d d d q p w Δ + Δ = Δ
 
where   denotes the overall general domestic productivity growth, which is a composite of 
traded goods and non-traded goods productivity growth given the respective weights
d q Δ
ρ and 
) 1 ( ρ − : 
 





d q q q Δ − + Δ = Δ ρ ρ
 
Inserting equations (7) and (9) in (8) yields equation (10), which can be interpreted as a measure 
for the overall long-run supply driven nominal wage growth in CEE: 
  







d Δ + Δ + Δ − Δ = Δ τ
 
where ) 1 ( + − = α ρ τ  is a positive constant term. According to equation (10) nominal wage growth 
is driven by productivity gains of the tradable goods sector relative to the non-tradable goods 
sector as well as by imported inflation in the traded goods sector and exchange rate 
changes .  e p
W
T Δ + Δ
 
The wage setting process can occur within two institutional environments. In countries pegging 
their exchange rates tightly to the euro, for instance Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia, the term  e Δ  is 
equal (or close) to zero. This reduces the uncertainty for the wage bargaining process, because 
trade unions and enterprises have solely to predict future productivity gains and traded goods 
inflation. In addition, in the Lindbeck model it is assumed that the biddings of trade unions for 
higher wages are constrained by the fixed exchange rate. Trade unions reap the full benefits of 
productivity gains and equilibrate the international competitiveness between CEE and the euro 
area. But, trade unions would not want to ask for wage increases above domestic productivity 
  9gains as this would erode the enterprises´ international competitiveness. If they would bid for 
wage increases above this level, profits of enterprises would shrink and entrepreneurs would be 
less willing to increase wages in the next bargaining period.  
 
In countries with freely floating exchange rates such as Poland or the Czech Republic an 
additional factor of uncertainty is introduced into the wage bargaining process as exchange rate 
volatility is high. To project future profits the enterprises in CEE have to know how the future 
exchange rate will be. If the exchange rate is regarded as an asset price which follows a random 
walk, there is uncertainty because the exchange rate may appreciate or depreciate. If – due to the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect – firms expect an appreciation of the domestic currency, they are 
reluctant to commit to wage increases as export revenues may decline. Therefore, we follow 
McKinnon and Schnabl (2006) and include a risk premium ψ  in equation (10), which captures 
discounts on wages originating in uncertainty arising from exchange rate fluctuations. The risk 
premium is assumed to be negative as (parts of) the costs of this uncertainty are passed through to 
workers. This implies:  
 









While in countries with an exchange rate peg ψ  and  e Δ are assumed to be (close to) zero, the 
exchange rate uncertainty in countries with flexible exchange rate regimes implies a negative risk 
premium on wages ( 0 < ψ ). 
 
 
4 Estimation Framework 
 
We investigate whether equation (11) holds for the CEE countries from an inter-temporal and 
cross-section perspective. We include eight CEE countries in our panel, which entered the 
European Union in May 2004, namely Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), 
Lithuania (LT), Latvia (LV), Poland (PL), Slovak Republic (SK), and Slovenia (SI). Bulgaria and 
Romania, which joined the European Union in January 2007, are omitted due to missing (wage) 
data. 
  10 
4.1 Data 
 
Our sample starts in the first quarter of 1996 and ends with the second quarter of 2007. Before 
1996 data on the former transition economies is very fragmented.  We use quarterly data, which 
is the smallest available frequency for all considered time series.
5 Nominal gross wages are from 
national statistics. Exchange rates (quarterly averages), inflation and productivity are drawn from 
Eurostat and IMF International Financial Statistics. Euro area tradable goods prices   are 
proxied by German export prices as export prices for the euro area are not available, and 
Germany is the largest country in the euro area.
W
T p
6 As a proxy for productivity we use nominal 
GDP per capita, because industrial and service sector production per employee are not available 
for the whole time period for every country at quarterly frequencies. As alternative productivity 
measure we use the ratio of consumer (CPI) to producer prices (PPI) analogous to De Grauwe 
and Schnabl (2005). Following Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964), this measure regards 
relative price increases of non-traded goods versus traded goods as a proxy for relative 
productivity gains.  
 
The quarterly averages of exchange rates are in price notation, which implies that a negative 
exchange rate change indicates an appreciation of the national currency against the euro. As 
proxies for the risk premium arising from exchange rate volatility we use the absolute and 
squared values of exchange rate returns. In addition, we consider intra-quarter realized 
volatilities, standard deviations of daily exchange rate changes and the z-score as proposed by 
Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2003).  With the exception of the volatility measures all time series are 
year-over-year quarterly growth rates. 
 
4.2. Descriptive Statistics  
 
Equation (11) implies that controlling for exchange rate changes, world traded goods inflation 
and relative productivity changes, countries with fixed exchange rates have a higher real wage 
                                                 
5    To adjust data seasonally, we calculate year-over-year growth rates instead of quarter-over-quarter growth rates. 
6   As alternative inflation measures, the harmonized consumer price index as well as the producer price index of the 
euro area (EU-12) have been used. Both proxies lead to similar results which are available upon request. 
  11growth. Note that domestic traded goods inflation has been substituted by euro area traded goods 
inflation and exchange rate changes. Therefore, the descriptive statistics focus on real wage 
growth. In contrast to the regressions in section 4.3., the descriptive statistics do not control for 
other determinants of real wages as in our Balassa-Samuelson specification. Given this caveat 
countries with hard pegs (to the euro) (i.e. LT, LV, EE) are expected in line with the Balassa-
Samuelson model to exhibit higher inflation than countries with flexible exchange rates (PL, CZ, 
HU, SK), and higher real wages.    
 
Figure 2 displays the real wage growth of the CEE countries since 1996. We observe that real 
wage growth tends to be higher in the Baltics than in countries with flexible exchange rates. 
Comparing the two corner solutions, Poland (free float) and Estonia (hard peg), real wage growth 
in Estonia has been significantly higher than in Poland.   
 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of real wage growth in the individual countries. In 
general, they support the conclusions drawn from the Lindbeck model. The mean and median of 
real wage growth in countries with fixed exchange rates are higher than wage growth in countries 
with free floats; e.g. Latvia has a real wage growth of 4.4 percent per year on average, while the 
real wage growth of Poland is on average 2.3 percent. Estonia has with an average real wage 
growth of 6.3 percent the greatest wage growth, while the Slovak Republic with a real wage 
growth of 2.1 percent has the smallest.   
 
A t-test (t1) which analyzes whether the individual means differ from the group mean, indicates 
that all means are different from the pooled mean. The average real wage growth of countries 
with a fixed exchange rate peg is significantly higher wage growth than the group mean, while in 
countries with flexible exchange rates – with the exception of Czech Republic – the average wage 
growth is below the pooled wage growth of 3.8 percent.
7  The F-test provides information with 
respect to equality of all means. The null hypothesis of equal means is rejected for all countries 




                                                 
7    An alternative t-test (t2) shows that the individual means are significantly different from zero. 
  12Figure 2: Real wage growth, year-over-year 
 
 
    Source: National statistics, 2008 (drawn from Reuters Econwin). 
 
 
The Fisher-ADF panel unit root test (Choi 2001, Madalla and Wu (1999)) is based on individual 
p-values for the unit root hypothesis which are combined in a second step to obtain an overall p-
value.  It does not find evidence for unit roots in the investigated panel. Henceforth, neither panel 
cointegration nor spurious regressions are a matter of concern. Motivated by these findings, we 
examine if there is a positive systematic relationship between exchange rate stability and wage 
growth in CEE. 
 
  13Table 2: Descriptive statistics, real wage growth (y-o-y, quarterly data) 
Country Mean Median  Max.  Min.  Std.  dev. Obs.  t1 t2








































All 0.038  0.031  0.184  -0.185 0.043 352     
F  63.971  (0.000)          
Notes: t2 is the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the mean is zero. t1 is the t-statistic for the null hypothesis that the 
individual mean does not significantly differ from the overall group mean. F is an F-statistic for the hypothesis that 
all means are equal. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
4.3. Estimation framework 
 
We estimate the Lindbeck model as in equation (11) for a CEE cross-country panel to identify the 
impact of exchange rate volatility on nominal wage growth. To specify the model properties we 
test for random effects against fixed effects.  
The Hausman-test gives a chi-squared distributed statistic of 2.184, and a p-value of 0.702 in 
favor of a random effects specification. 
  14Based on equation (11) we estimate the following model: 
           
Δwit =μ + βΔqit
diff + λΔpt
W + γΔeit + φψit + uit   with uit =μi + vit,              (12)     
    
where  Δqit
diff  is the productivity differential, i=1,..,8 denotes the cross-section and 
t=1996Q1,…,2007Q2 the time dimension. The term μ  denotes the overall constant, while μi 
denotes the country-specific deviations fromμ . The random effects specification assumes that the 
country-specific effects are realizations of independent random variables with mean zero and 
finite variance. Most importantly, the random effect specification assumes that the individual 
country specific effect is uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic residualvit. The estimation of the 
covariance matrix for the composite error uses the quadratic unbiased estimators from Swamy-
Arora. The parameters are estimated with generalized panel least squares and we use White 
period standard errors (White 1980, Arellano 1987) to cope with possible cross-sectional 




The estimation results are reported in Table 3 for the baseline regressions, where equation (12) is 
estimated with GDP per capita growth as productivity measure, German export price inflation as 
proxy for international traded goods prices, exchange rate changes in price notation and the 
different volatility measures described in the data section.  
 
In the baseline regression (Table 3, column 1) with squared exchange rate changes as volatility 
measure all estimated parameters have the expected sign. The productivity measure and the 
exchange rate term are significant at the common levels. In the lower part of the table the 
individual country effects  i μ  are displayed. To derive individual constant terms the country-
specific terms have to be added to the overall constant term. The country specific constant terms 
are in comparison to a fixed effect model not deterministic, but random. This allows capturing 
country-specific effects in our heterogeneous panel. However, due to its random character, the 
different random effects can not be compared with each other.  
 
  15All signs of the estimates are congruent with the Lindbeck model. Increasing productivity 
(positive  β term) is linked to increasing wages at the common significance levels. Changes in 
German export prices (as proxy for euro area traded goods inflation) (λ   term) have no 
significant impact on nominal wage growth.
8 The γ  coefficient, which captures the impact of 
exchange rate changes on wages, has the expected positive sign at the 1 % significance level. 
 
If home currency is appreciating (depreciating) against the euro (e <0 (e>0)) nominal wages 
decline (increase). This implies that the exchange rate regime has a significant impact on wage 
determination in the eight analyzed CEE countries. 
 
Among productivity growth, euro area tradable goods inflation and exchange rate changes, 
exchange rate changes have the highest impact on nominal wage growth as indicated by the 
largest coefficient. A ten percent exchange rate appreciation (depreciation) is linked to roughly 
five percentage points lower (higher) wage growth.  
 
Table 3 reports our baseline regression with different volatility measures to check the sensitivity 
of our results. Alternatively to squared returns, we consider absolute exchange rate changes 
(modulus) as well as a realized volatility measure that is based on daily intra-quarter information 
(for the compilation see Andersen et al. 2003). Realized volatility aggregates information from 
higher frequencies to obtain more accurate estimates of unobserved intra-period volatility. 
Another volatility measure is the standard deviation of daily exchange rate changes. The z-score 
(the root of the squared mean of exchange rate changes and its variances) as proposed by Ghosh, 
Gulde and Wolf (2003), links exchange rate changes and its standard deviation.  
 
Estimating equation (13) with different volatility measures does not change our main conclusion. 
All parameters originating in the Lindbeck model remain widely unchanged. Productivity growth 
increases nominal wage growth, while tradable goods inflation in the euro area has no significant 
impact on wages. Currency appreciation (depreciation) against the euro lowers (increases) 
nominal wage growth. The size of the coefficients  λ β,  andγ  remains widely the same. 
 
                                                 
8    In a shorter sample which starts in 1999 the λ -terms turns positive and significant.  
  16Table 3: Panel estimation results, baseline regressions 
 


























































CZ μ   -0.002 -0.002  -0.001  -0.002  -0.004 
EE μ   0.000 0.000  0.000  0.002  0.003 
HU μ   0.006 0.005  0.002  0.003  0.014 
LV μ   0.006 0.006  0.003  0.008  0.014 
LT μ   -0.004 -0.005  -0.002  -0.005  -0.013 
PL μ   -0.004 -0.003  -0.002  -0.005  -0.011 
SK μ   -0.004 -0.004  -0.002  -0.004  -0.009 
SI μ   0.001 0.002  0.001  0.002  0.006 
2 R
  0.319 0.316  0.321  0.312  0.332 
obs 352  352  352  352  352 
Notes: White period standard errors. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below estimates. ***/**/* 
indicates that values are significantly different from 1 at the 1/5/10 percent level. 
2 R  denotes the adjusted 
coefficient of determination. obs shows the total number of observations. 
 
The results for different measures of exchange rate volatility differ within the regressions. 
Absolute returns, realized volatility, and the z-score proxies for uncertainty have the expected 
negative sign but only the absolute returns are statistically significant at the common levels. In 
contrast, theφ coefficient is positive for the standard deviation but remains insignificant.  
  17 
The estimated country-specific μi coefficients show (for all regressions) that with the exception 
of Hungary and Lithuania, countries pegging their exchange rate to the euro have a higher 
country-specific constant term. All in all, the evidence for a significant effect of the exchange rate 
regime on wages is strong as all exchange rate terms and four out of five of the risk premium-
terms have the expected sign mostly at significant levels. 
 
4.4. Robustness Checks 
 
We have performed a set of robustness checks. First, we estimated our baseline regressions with 
an alternative productivity measure. Relative changes of consumer versus producer prices were 
used as a proxy for relative productivity changes. The estimated results are reported in Table 4.  
 
As in the baseline regression from the previous section, higher productivity growth is linked to 
higher wage growth.  Euro area tradable goods inflation has, in contrast to the previous 
estimation, a positive and significant influence on wage growth. A currency appreciation lowers 
wage growth (positiveγ coefficient). The impact of exchange rate changes on wages is however 
smaller than in the baseline regressions. A currency appreciation (depreciation) of around ten 
percent is transmitted via the wage bargaining process into three percent lower (higher) wages. 
The results are very robust throughout the set of different volatility measures. Euro area tradable 
goods inflation has the highest impact on nominal wages followed by productivity growth and 
exchange rate changes.   
 
The φ-coefficient isolates the discount on wages due to uncertainty originating in exchange rate 
volatility. Exchange rate volatility has a significant negative impact on nominal wages when 
using the squared and absolute exchange rate returns as proxies for exchange rate volatility. 
Realized volatility, standard deviations as well as the z-score enter the equation insignificantly. 
To this end, the evidence for lower wages due to exchange rate volatility is mixed. For all 
regressions country-specific effects are similar to those in the baseline regression. But for 
Slovenia the country-specific effect turns negative, indicating a smaller constant term than 
average. 
 
  18Table 4: Panel estimation results, alternative productivity measure  
 


























































CZ μ   -0.010 -0.009  -0.009  -0.010  -0.010 
EE μ   0.013 0.011  0.014  0.017  0.017 
HU μ   0.019 0.018  0.017  0.016  0.017 
LV μ   0.005 0.005  0.004  0.005  0.005 
LT μ   -0.005 -0.006  -0.006  -0.006  -0.006 
PL μ   -0.008 -0.008  -0.009  -0.012  -0.012 
SK μ   -0.006 -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005 
SI μ   -0.008 -0.007  -0.006  -0.005  -0.005 
2 R
  0.188 0.181  0.172  0.166  0.166 
obs 320  320  320  320  320 
Notes: White period standard errors. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below estimates. ***/**/* 
indicates that values are significantly different from 1 at the 1/5/10 percent level. 
2 R  denotes the adjusted coefficient 
of determination. obs shows the total number of observations. 
 
The estimates can be subject to endogeneity bias, in particular with respect to the productivity 
measures. Higher productivity may drive up wages, but higher wages could also influence 
productivity. To address this possible endogeneity bias, we implement an instrumental variable 
estimator (IV). We use a two-stage least squares estimator with White period standard errors 
  19(White 1980). Up to four lags of the endogenous variable as well as of the exogenous variables 
are used as instruments. The results are shown in Table 5. 
 
The Lindbeck model is widely confirmed for CEE countries and the evidence for a negative 
impact of exchange rate uncertainty on wage growth is strong. Productivity growth increases 
wage growth (for the specifications with realized volatility, standard deviation and z-score at 
highly significant levels). Euro area tradable goods inflation has no significant influence on 
wages. Exchange rate changes contribute to lower wage growth in times of appreciation. A ten 
percent appreciation (depreciation) is associated with about five percent lower (higher) wages. 
Exchange rate volatility has a clearly negative impact on wages for most proxies (φ-term). When 
using squared returns, absolute exchange rate returns or the z-score as proxies the coefficients are 
negative and highly significant. Otherwise the impact is insignificant. As in the previous 
regressions, the country specific constant terms remain stable. 
 
All in all we can summarize that there is a high and significant negative relationship between 
exchange rates and nominal wage growth. The wage bargaining process seems to be strongly 
influenced under flexible exchange rates. Trade unions and enterprises are forced to predict 
exchange rate changes next to productivity growth which inputs further uncertainty in the wage 
determination process. This may result in bargaining for smaller wage increases due to possible 
losses in competitiveness. The impact of exchange rate volatility on wage growth remains mixed.  
 
In some specifications exchange rate uncertainty is linked with decreasing wages, but in some 
specifications this effect turns out to be insignificant. Nonetheless, based on the Lindbeck 
framework our results provide us evidence that the exchange rate regime significantly influences 
the wage determination process in CEE. 
 
5. Implications for the Wage and Exchange Rate Policies 
We analyzed the role of the exchange rate on the wage determination process in CEE. Up to now 
exchange rate strategies differ across CEE, and there is a controversial discussion about the 
appropriate exchange rate system during the run-up to the EMU.  
 
  20Table 5: Panel estimation results, IV estimation  
 


























































CZ μ   -0.002 -0.004  -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
EE μ   0.004 0.006  0.003  0.013  -0.006 
HU μ   0.017 0.025  0.016  -0.001  0.030 
LV μ   0.004 0.006  0.002  0.008  0.012 
LT μ   -0.022 -0.030  -0.024  -0.022  -0.036 
PL μ   0.001 0.001  -0.000  -0.007  -0.009 
SK μ   -0.002 -0.003  -0.004  -0.001  -0.006 
SI μ   -0.000 -0.000  0.006  0.010  0.015 
2 R
  0.249 0.379  0.150  0.152  0.203 
obs 288  288  288  288  325 
Notes: White period standard errors. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below estimates. ***/**/* 
indicates that values are significantly different from 1 at the 1/5/10 percent level. 
2 R  denotes the adjusted 
coefficient of determination. obs shows the total number of observations.  
 
The objectives of full employment, fair working conditions, productivity, employment and 
cohesion are at the centre of EU economic policy. In this context wage policy in CEE is an 
important issue for European economic policy making due to an increasing degree of labor 
market integration in the enlarged European Union.  
  21We derived from the Scandinavian model of wage determination that in emerging markets such 
as in CEE, trade unions could reap a higher benefit in the form of higher nominal and real wage 
growth in countries with a fixed exchange rate than in countries with flexible exchange rates.  
Therefore, it is claimed that fixed exchange rates provide a more stable and welfare enhancing 
framework during the economic catch-up process.  
 
The results from our empirical estimation lead us to the conclusion that flexible exchange rates 
affect nominal wage growth negatively. As nominal exchange rates appreciate, nominal wages 
increases are smaller. In addition, there is some evidence that higher exchange rate uncertainty 
will lead to a discount on nominal and real wage increases, as uncertainty for the wage bargaining 
process increases. In contrast, pegging the exchange rate tightly to the euro implied that nominal 
and real wage increases tend to be higher.  
 
The economic policy conclusion is that the Central and Eastern European economies should 
adopt a fixed exchange rate regime during the economic catch-up process. The finding is in line 
with Schnabl (2008) who finds higher growth in countries at the EMU periphery with fixed 
exchange rate regimes. From this perspective, the benefits of higher growth and welfare in 
countries with fixed exchange rate regimes can be distributed via higher wages granted to the 
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